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Chenoweth v. Clinton
(Note: This is historic in that it shows the resolve U.S.
Congresswoman Helen Chenoweth had for the constitutional Republic
which she had sworn to uphold by serving in the Congress of the United
States of America. This backbone and moxie is almost extinct. What a
shock this must have been to the majority of the denizen of
Washington, D.C.! "Dismissed for lack of standing..."
Source: Appendices, Page 97/18, National Marine Fisheries Service /
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/AHR/append80-102web.pdf and
http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/ABMlawsuit/abmsuit.pdf Pages
12-13)
No. 99-944
In the Supreme Court of the United States
HELEN CHENOWETH, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ANDREW MERGEN
ETHAN G. SHENKMAN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether individual Members of Congress have standing to challenge a
presidential Executive Order on the ground that the Order exceeded the
President's statutory authority.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 99-944
HELEN CHENOWETH, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-15) is reported at
181 F.3d 112. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 16-28) is
reported at 997 F. Supp. 2d 36.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 2, 1999. A
petition for rehearing was denied on September 3, 1999 (Pet. App. 29).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 2, 1999.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Petitioners are four Members of the United States House of
Representatives. They brought suit in federal district court,
challenging the validity of Executive Order No. (E.O.) 13,061, 3 C.F.R.
221 (1998) (Pet. App. 30-38), which established the President's
American Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI).1
The AHRI is a non-regulatory initiative
designed "to support community-based efforts to preserve,
protect, and restore [designated] rivers and their communities."
E.O. 13,061, § 1(f) (Pet. App. 31). Local
communities are invited to nominate rivers or river segments to be
designated as American Heritage Rivers, based on their natural,
historic, cultural, or economic values or other unique
characteristics. E.O. 13,061, § 2 (Pet. App. 33-35).
For each designated river, the Executive Order states that federal
agencies, "to the extent permitted by law and consistent with
their missions and resources, shall coordinate Federal plans,
functions, programs, and resources" to assist local communities
in their river protection or economic revitalization efforts.
E.O. 13,061, § 1(b) (Pet. App. 30). Agencies may use federal
facilities to support the goals of the AHRI, but
only "to the extent permitted by law and consistent with
the agencies' missions and resources." E.O. 13,061, §
1(j) (Pet. App. 32).
2. Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, seeking a declaration that E.O. 13,061
is illegal and an injunction against its implementation.2
Pet. App. 3. Petitioners alleged that the President lacked statutory
authority to establish the AHRI. They claimed that E.O. 13,061
therefore violated the separation of powers doctrine; the Commerce
Clause (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3); the Property Clause (Art. IV, § 3, Cl.
2); the Spending Clause (Art. I, § 9, Cl. 7); the Tenth Amendment;
the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.; the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Pet
App. 17.
The district court concluded that petitioners lacked standing
to sue and accordingly dismissed the complaint. Pet. App. 16-28. The
court found that "[t]he quality of plaintiffs' injury * * * is
too abstract and not sufficiently specific to support a finding of
standing." Id. at 23. It explained that under District of
Columbia Circuit precedent, "an injury like the one claimed by
[petitioners], perpetrated by the Executive branch and unrelated to a
specific piece of legislation, is not sufficiently specific to support
standing." Id. at 24.
3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-15.
a. The court of appeals held (Pet. App. 7-10) that petitioners'
standing arguments were foreclosed by Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 830 (1997), in which this Court concluded that individual
Members of Congress did not have standing to bring a constitutional
challenge to the Line Item Veto Act. The court explained that
"the injury [petitioners] allegedly suffered when the President
issued Executive Order 13,061-a dilution of their authority as
legislators-is * * * identical to the injury the Court in Raines
deprecated as 'widely dispersed' and 'abstract.'" Pet. App. 8-9.
The court also stated that petitioners' suit would not have been
allowed to go forward even under the District of Columbia Circuit's
pre-Raines precedents. Under those precedents, the court of appeals
concluded, petitioners' alleged injury would have been "found * *
* sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement," but the
complaint would nevertheless have been dismissed in the court's
exercise of "equitable discretion." Id. at 10 (citing Moore
v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985)).
b. Judge Tatel filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
Pet. App. 13-15. Judge Tatel agreed with the majority that petitioners
lack standing to sue. Id. at 13. Rather than address the impact of
Raines on existing circuit precedent, however, Judge Tatel would have
based his decision on United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v.
Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which held that a Member of
Congress lacked standing to contest the legality of an Executive
Order. See Pet. App. 14.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals' decision is correct and does not conflict with
any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals. Further
review is not warranted.
1. Petitioners contend (Pet. 14) that the court of appeals'
"opinion permitting the President to enact a law contrary to the
process set forth in the Constitution jeopardizes [the]
liberties" protected by principles of separation of powers. The
question presented in this Court, however, is whether petitioners have
standing to sue. This Court has "consistently held that a
plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about
government-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large- does not state an Article III case or
controversy." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573-574 (1992). The Court's decision in Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811 (1997), makes clear that the same principle applies where
a Member of Congress invokes the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
See id. at 830 (holding that the plaintiffs' challenge to the Line
Item Veto Act should be dismissed because the plaintiff Members of
Congress "do not have a sufficient 'personal stake' in this
dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have
established Article III standing").
2. Petitioners' reliance (Pet. 17-18, 22-25) on Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), is misplaced. In Coleman, 21 (out of 40) state
senators brought a mandamus action in the Kansas Supreme Court. Id. at
436. The gravamen of their suit was that the State's Lieutenant
Governor, as presiding officer of the Senate, had improperly cast a
tie-breaking vote in support of ratification of a proposed amendment
to the United States Constitution. Id. at 435-436. The state supreme
court entertained the suit on the merits, concluded that the
Lieutenant Governor was authorized to cast the deciding vote, and held
on that basis that the proposed amendment had been properly ratified
by the Kansas Legislature. Id. at 437. The plaintiffs then sought
review in this Court, which held that "at least the twenty
senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would have
been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the proposed
constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy which,
treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding
the federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to
review that decision." Id. at 446; see Raines, 521 U.S. at
822-823 (summarizing Coleman).
In Raines, this Court held that "Coleman stands (at most) for the
proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to
defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if
that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect),
on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified."
521 U.S. at 823 (citation omitted). The plaintiffs in Raines, by
contrast, could "not allege[] that they voted for a specific
bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the
bill was nonetheless deemed defeated." Id. at 824. While
acknowledging that the Line Item Veto Act might in some sense reduce
the "effectiveness" of the plaintiffs' votes on future
appropriations bills (see id. at 825), the Court explained that
"[t]here is a vast difference between the level of vote
nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of
institutional legislative power that is alleged here. To uphold
standing here would require a drastic extension of Coleman. We are
unwilling to take that step." Id. at 826.
Like the plaintiffs in Raines (and unlike the plaintiffs in Coleman),
petitioners cannot claim that they comprised all or part of a
legislative majority that would have enacted (or defeated) a specific
legislative measure but for the action of the President. Executive
Order No. 13,061 does nothing to prevent Members of Congress from
debating or voting on any bill they wish, and it does not purport to
alter the legal effect of their votes.3 The injury alleged here is
nothing more than the "wholly abstract" diminution of
legislative power that can be asserted whenever the Executive Branch
is alleged to have acted in violation of applicable statutes. Raines,
521 U.S. at 829. To recognize standing in this case would vest
individual Members of Congress with unfettered access to the courts to
challenge the validity of any Executive Branch action they believe to
be unlawful-a result severely at odds with the separation of powers
principles that underlie Article III standing requirements.4
3. Petitioners contend (Pet. 25-27) that the court of appeals
improperly abandoned prior circuit precedent based on a
misunderstanding of this Court's decision in Raines. An intra-circuit
conflict typically provides no basis for invoking this Court's review.
See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957). In
any event, all three members of the panel in this case agreed that
petitioners' suit would be foreclosed even under the principles of
legislative standing developed in the District of Columbia Circuit
before Raines was decided. See Pet. App. 10 (majority states that
petitioners would have been found to have standing, but that their
suit would have been dismissed on the ground of equitable discretion);
id. at 13-15 (Judge Tatel concludes that petitioners would lack
standing under prior circuit law).
As Judge Tatel explained (Pet. App. 14), the District of Columbia
Circuit case most closely on point is United Presbyterian Church
in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J.). In that case, an individual Member of Congress (along with other
plaintiffs) filed suit to challenge an Executive Order governing
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the
Executive Branch. Id. at 1377. The plaintiff Member "assert[ed]
that the Executive Order confer[red] authority on the intelligence
agencies beyond that authorized by Congress, and indeed that the order
violate[d] express limitations imposed by Congress." Id. at 1381.
He contended on that basis "that his powers as a legislator ha[d]
been diminished, constituting sufficient injury to give him
standing." Ibid. The court of appeals rejected that claim,
holding that the plaintiff Member lacked standing because "his
complaint [wa]s 'a generalized grievance about the conduct of
government.'" Id. at 1382 (quoting Moore v. United States
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d at 952). Indeed, petitioners
cite no decision of any court suggesting that Executive Branch conduct
violative of statutory restrictions, or in excess of statutory
authority, inflicts a judicially cognizable injury upon an individual
legislator.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ANDREW MERGEN
ETHAN G. SHENKMAN
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 2000
1 After the President announced his intention to establish the AHRI,
three of the petitioners introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives that would have "terminate[d] further development
and implementation of the" initiative. See Pet. App. 2-3 (citing
H.R. 1842, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)). That bill never came to a
vote. Ibid.
2 When petitioners' complaint was filed in December 1997 (see
Pet. 4), local communities had nominated 126 rivers or river segments.
See 63 Fed. Reg. 25,479 (1998). No rivers were
selected, however, until July 30, 1998 (well after the district court
had issued its decision in this case, see Pet. App. 16), when
the President named 14 American Heritage Rivers from among those
nominated. See 63 Fed. Reg. 41,949 (1998).
3 Petitioners argue (Pet. 18, 24 & n.19) that they cannot
overturn E.O. 13,061 through a majority vote in each House because the
President can be expected to veto any such bill. They contend (Pet.
18) that the prospect of a presidential veto distinguishes this case
from Raines, where the Court observed that "a majority of
Senators and Congressmen" could vote to pass or reject
appropriations bills, to repeal the Line Item Veto Act, or to exempt a
particular appropriations bill (or provision thereof) from the Act's
coverage. 521 U.S. at 824. In fact, however, the Court in
Raines specifically noted the possibility of a presidential veto. See
id. at 825 n.9.
4 Petitioners seek to characterize E.O. 13,061 as an incursion
on their legislative powers, arguing that "the Members were not
allowed to vote for or against enactment of the AHRI prior to
President Clinton's unilateral enactment of the AHRI."
Pet. 18; see also Pet. 19-20 ("despite the requirement of the
Constitution that only Congress may enact laws, President Clinton
enacted the AHRI unilaterally by Executive Order 13061"). As this
Court has recognized, however, "[a]mendment and repeal of
statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I." INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983). Any Executive Branch conduct
alleged to violate statutory requirements or proscriptions could, on
petitioner's theory of standing, be recharacterized as an implied
amendment or repeal of an enacted law.
Related reading:
President Clinton's Executive Order
#13061
CWA Joins Opposition to American
Heritage Rivers Initiative
February 16, 2000
Concerned Women for America, participating as a friend of the court
along with other groups, filed a
brief supporting the challenge to President Clinton's executive
order (EO), the American Heritage Rivers Initiative (AHRI).
Reps. Helen Chenoweth-Hage (R-Idaho), Richard
W. Pombo (R-California), Bob
Schaffer (R-Colorado) and Don
Young (R-Alaska), filed the lawsuit, which is currently awaiting the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision to hear it.
In his 1997 State of the Union address, Clinton announced his
intention to create the American Heritage Rivers Initiative, whereby he
would designate selected "Heritage Rivers" to "help
communities alongside them to revitalize their waterfronts and clean up
pollution," the EO states. Clinton issued the EO on
September 11, 1997, establishing an interagency committee "to
protect and restore rivers and their adjacent communities" and to
"preserve the historical and cultural heritage" of the rivers.
According to the EO, the federal government supports local
communities in achieving the initiative's objectives. The communities
nominate rivers to the President?s Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ),
which determines whether the rivers will be designated. These designated
rivers then qualify for federal assistance.
To date, there are 14 American heritage
rivers:
The Cuyahoga River in Ohio;
The Upper Susquehanna and Lackawanna
Rivers in Pennsylvania; and
The Willamette River in Oregon.
But on December 10, 1997, the legislators filed a lawsuit in
the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia to
challenge Clinton's authority to implement this initiative.
"The very designation creates yet another obstacle,
legal or not, and yet another tool for the use by environmental
extremists to stop the wise use of our lands," said Mrs.
Chenoweth-Hage (Washington Times,
7/15/97). She and other western Republicans worry the Clinton
administration is using the auspices of
"preservation" to illegally seize private property.
Before filing the lawsuit, Mrs. Chenoweth-Hage and 46 other
legislators introduced H.R.
1842 to terminate further development and
implementation of the AHRI. The bill passed the House
Resources Committee by voice vote on November 5,
1997. However, the bill never reached the House floor and was
not reintroduced.
From elected officials to the grassroots, others foresee
dangers of federal land control in their communities as burdening
property use and restricting their enjoyment of the rivers. Further,
opponents of the initiative worry that "river" will be
expanded to mean any land for miles around, and that "river
community" will eventually include anyone who wants to stall
development.
In addition to Concerned Women for America, eight more
members of Congress and three other like-minded organizations signed on
to the amicus brief. They argue that, under Article
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, Reps.
Chenoweth-Hage, Pombo, Schaffer and Young have standing to sue the
president on this case. They argue that in issuing this order and
bypassing Congress, Clinton "completely nullified" the vote of
every member of Congress, as guaranteed by Article
I, Section 7, Chenoweth v. Clinton, No. 99-944 (U.S.
filed December 30, 1999).
The AHRI is just one example of Clinton's land grab for
"preservation." On September 18, 1996, he turned 1.7 million
acres of Utah land into the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
via proclamation --
without consulting Utah officials. Clinton acted under the Antiquities
Act, passed by Congress in 1906 and used by several presidents to
protect federal lands and "objects of historic and scientific
interest." The proclamation locked up the largest reserve of
high-quality coal and minerals in the continental U.S.
Clinton invoked the Antiquities Act again on January 11, 2000, when
he issued
proclamations creating three new national monuments and extending a
fourth. The latest proclamations ban mining and development on
more than 1 million acres of western land. The proclamations
and affected areas:
"This is not about locking lands
up, it is about freeing them up from the pressures of development and
the threat of sprawl," said Clinton (Washington
Times, 1/12/00).
As with the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument, Clinton did not
consult with state officials before signing the proclamations. "This
administration has ignored the public process and has purposefully
excluded Congress in a deliberate attempt to put politics before the
wishes of the public," said Rep.
Bob Stump, the Arizona Republican who represents the affected area.
This unconstitutional procedure -- issuing executive orders without
congressional approval -- is at the heart of Chenoweth v. Clinton.
The legislators seek to prevent further circumvention of the legislative
process.
Concerned Women for America
1015 Fifteenth St. N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-488-7000
Fax: 202-488-0806
~~~~~
1146
TOM CAMPBELL, MEMBER, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. WILLIAM JEFFERSON
CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLEE
No. 99-5214
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
340 U.S. App. D.C. 149; 203 F.3d 19; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2419
October 22, 1999, Argued
February 18, 2000, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1] Certiorari Denied October
2, 2000, Reported at: 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4928.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. (No. 99cv01072).
DISPOSITION: District court affirmed.
COUNSEL: Jules L. Lobel argued the cause for appellants. With
him on the briefs were H. Lee Halterman, Joel E. Starr, Michael Ratner,
Jennifer M. Green, Franklin Siegel, William Goodman, and James R.
Klimaski.
William B. Schultz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were David W.
Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark B. Stern and Robert M.
Loeb, Attorneys, and Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.
JUDGES: Before: SILBERMAN, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN. Separate
concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN. Separate opinion
concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH. Separate
concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
OPINIONBY: SILBERMAN; RANDOLPH; TATEL
OPINION: [*19] SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: A
number of congressmen, led by Tom Campbell of California, filed suit
claiming that the President violated the War Powers Resolution and the
War Powers Clause of the Constitution by directing U.S. forces'
participation in the recent NATO campaign [**2] in
Yugoslavia. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. We
agree with the district court and therefore affirm.
[*20] I.
On March 24, 1999, President Clinton announced the commencement of
NATO air and cruise missile attacks on Yugoslav targets. Two days
later he submitted to Congress a report, "consistent with the War
Powers Resolution," detailing the circumstances necessitating the
use of armed forces, the deployment's scope and expected duration, and
asserting that he had "taken these actions pursuant to [his]
authority ... as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive." On
April 28, Congress voted on four resolutions related to the Yugoslav
conflict: It voted down a declaration of war 427 to 2 and an
"authorization" of the air strikes 213 to 213, but it also
voted against requiring the President to immediately end U.S.
participation in the NATO operation and voted to fund that
involvement. The conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia continued for 79
days, ending on June 10 with Yugoslavia's agreement to withdraw its
forces from Kosovo and allow deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping
force. n1 Throughout this period Pentagon, State Department, and NATO
spokesmen informed the [**3] public on a frequent basis of
developments in the fighting.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 U.S. forces are currently stationed in Kosovo, which remains part
of Yugoslavia, as part of the peacekeeping operation, but appellants
do not claim that this deployment is relevant to their case.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Appellants, 31 congressmen opposed to U.S. involvement in the Kosovo
intervention, filed suit prior to termination of that conflict seeking
a declaratory judgment that the President's use of American forces
against Yugoslavia was unlawful under both the War Powers Clause of
the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution ("the WPR"). See
50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. The WPR requires the President to
submit a report within 48 hours "in any case in which United
States Armed Forces are introduced ... into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances," and to "terminate any use
of United States Armed Forces with respect to which a report was
submitted (or required [**4] to be submitted), unless the
Congress ... has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization
for such use of United States Armed Forces" within 60 days.
Appellants claim that the President did submit a report sufficient to
trigger the WPR on March 26, or in any event was required to submit a
report by that date, but nonetheless failed to end U.S. involvement in
the hostilities after 60 days. The district court granted the
President's motion to dismiss, see Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), and this appeal followed.
II.
The government does not respond to appellants' claim on the merits.
Instead the government challenges the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to adjudicate this claim on three separate grounds: the case is
moot; appellants lack standing, as the district court concluded; and
the case is non-justiciable. Since we agree with the district court
that the congressmen lack standing it is not necessary to decide
whether there are other jurisdictional defects.
The question whether congressmen have standing in federal court to
challenge the lawfulness of actions of the executive was answered, at
least in large part, in the Supreme [**5] Court's recent
decision in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849,
117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). Raines involved a constitutional
challenge to the President's authority under the short-lived Line Item
Veto Act. Individual congressmen claimed that under that Act a
President could veto (unconstitutionally) only part of a law and
thereby diminish the institutional power of Congress. Observing it had
never held that congressmen have standing to assert an institutional
injury as against the executive, [*21] see id. at
821, n2 the Court held that petitioners in the case lacked
"legislative standing" to challenge the Act. The Court
observed that petitioners already possessed an adequate political
remedy, since they could vote to have the Line Item Veto Act repealed,
or to provide individual spending bills with a statutory exemption. See
id. at 829.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 The Court noted that it had found standing for a congressman in Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944
(1969), where he was unconstitutionally excluded from Congress, thus
depriving him of a salary and the House seat he was constitutionally
due, both personal injuries. The Court did not decide whether
congressmen would have standing to challenge actions of Congress which
diminished their institutional role. Cf. Michel v. Anderson,
304 U.S. App. D.C. 325, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (congressmen had
standing to challenge House rule which diluted their vote in Committee
of the Whole).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**6]
Thereafter in Chenoweth
v. Clinton,
337 U.S. App.
D.C. 1, 181
F.3d 112, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999), emphasizing the separation-of-powers
problems inherent in legislative standing, we held that congressmen
had no standing to challenge the President's introduction of a program
through executive order rather than statute. As in Raines,
appellants contended that the President's action inflicted an
institutional injury upon Congress, in this case by circumventing its
legislative authority, but, we said,
It is uncontested that the Congress could
terminate the [contested program] were a sufficient number in each
House so inclined. Because the parties' dispute is therefore fully
susceptible to political resolution, we would [under circuit
precedent] dismiss the complaint to avoid "meddling in the
internal affairs of the legislative branch." Applying Raines,
we would reach the same conclusion.
Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
There remains, however, a soft spot in the legal barrier against
congressional legal challenges to executive action, and it is a soft
spot that appellants sought to penetrate. In 1939 the Supreme Court in
Coleman v. Miller voted [**7] 5-4 to recognize the
standing of Kansas State legislators in the Supreme Court to challenge
the actions of the Kansas Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
State Senate. See 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385
(1939). That case arose out of a State Senate vote on the ratification
of a constitutional amendment, the Child Labor Amendment, proposed by
Congress in 1924. The State Senate split 20 to 20, and the Lieutenant
Governor, the presiding officer of the Senate, then cast a deciding
vote in favor. The State House subsequently also passed a ratification
resolution. Thereupon the twenty State Senators who voted against
ratification plus one more (who presumably had voted for the
resolution) brought a mandamus action in the State Supreme Court
challenging the Lieutenant Governor's right to vote. n3 They sought an
order compelling the Secretary of the Senate to erase the endorsement
on the resolution and restraining the Secretary of State from
authenticating the resolution and passing it on to the Governor. The
Supreme Court of Kansas entertained the action but ruled against the
plaintiffs on the merits. Granting certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court determined that "at least the [**8]
twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would
have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ... have an interest ...
sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction," id. at 446,
because they have a legal interest "in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes." Id. at 438.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 The government also challenges the congressmen's standing on the
basis that they do not constitute a majority of the Congress. In Raines
the Supreme Court did "attach some importance to the fact that
appellees have not been authorized to represent their respective
Houses of Congress in this action," but it declined to say how
much importance. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829-30. Because we find
that appellants lack standing for another reason, we need not discuss
that issue.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*22] In Raines the plaintiff congressmen had
relied on Coleman to argue that they had standing because the
presidential veto had undermined the "effectiveness of their
votes." The Supreme Court [**9] noted that Coleman
might be distinguished on grounds that the federal constitutional
separation of powers concerns that underlay its decision in Raines
(and which we emphasized in Chenoweth) were not present, or
that if the Court in Coleman had not taken the case a question
of federal law--the ratification vel non by the Kansas
Legislature--would remain as decided by the Kansas Court. But cf.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 465-66 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). But the
Court thought it unnecessary to cabin Coleman on those grounds.
See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.8. Instead, the Court emphasized
that the congressmen were not asserting that their votes had been
"completely nullified":
They have not alleged that they voted for a
specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill,
and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated....
Nor can they allege that the Act will nullify their votes in the
future in the same way that the votes of the Coleman
legislators had been nullified ...
In addition, a majority of Senators and Congressmen can vote to
repeal the Act, or to exempt a given appropriations bill...
[**10] Id. at 824.
Here the plaintiff congressmen, by specifically defeating the War
Powers Resolution authorization by a tie vote and by defeating a
declaration of war, sought to fit within the Coleman exception
to the Raines rule. This parliamentary tactic led to an
extensive argument before us as to exactly what the Supreme Court
meant by a claim that a legislator's vote was completely
"nullified."
It is, to be sure, not readily apparent what the Supreme Court meant
by that word. It would seem the Court used nullify to mean treating a
vote that did not pass as if it had, or vice versa. The
"nullification" alleged in this case therefore differs from Coleman
in a significant respect. In that case state officials endorsed a
defeated ratification, treating it as approved, while the President
here did not claim to be acting pursuant to the defeated declaration
of war or a statutory authorization, but instead "pursuant to
[his] constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and
as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive." See Letter to
Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia [**11] and
Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 528 (March 26, 1999). The
Court did not suggest in Raines that the President
"nullifies" a congressional vote and thus legislators have
standing whenever the government does something Congress voted
against, still less that congressmen would have standing anytime a
President allegedly acts in excess of statutory authority. As the
government correctly observes, appellants' statutory argument,
although cast in terms of the nullification of a recent vote,
essentially is that the President violated the quarter-century old War
Powers Resolution. Similarly, their constitutional argument is that
the President has acted illegally--in excess of his authority--because
he waged war in the constitutional sense without a congressional
delegation. Neither claim is analogous to a Coleman
nullification.
We think the key to understanding the Court's treatment of Coleman
and its use of the word nullification is its implicit recognition that
a ratification vote on a constitutional amendment is an unusual
situation. It is not at all clear whether once the amendment was
"deemed ratified," see Raines, 521 U.S. at 822, the
Kansas Senate [**12] could have done anything [*23]
to reverse that position. n4 We think that must be what the Supreme
Court implied when it said the Raines plaintiffs could not
allege that the "[Line Item Veto Act] would nullify their votes in
the future," and that, after all, a majority of senators and
congressmen could always repeal the Line Item Veto Act. Id. at
824 (emphasis added). The Coleman senators, by contrast, may
well have been powerless to rescind a ratification of a constitutional
amendment that they claimed had been defeated. In other words, they
had no legislative remedy. Under that reading--which we think explains
the very narrow possible Coleman exception to Raines--appellants
fail because they continued, after the votes, to enjoy ample
legislative power to have stopped prosecution of the "war."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
N4 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450 ("The question of the
efficacy of ratifications of state legislatures, in the light of ...
attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political
question....").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**13]
In this case, Congress certainly could have passed a law forbidding
the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign; indeed, there was a
measure--albeit only a concurrent resolution--introduced to require
the President to withdraw U.S. troops. Unfortunately, however, for
those congressmen who, like appellants, desired an end to U.S.
involvement in Yugoslavia, this measure was defeated by a 139
to 290 vote. Of course, Congress always retains appropriations
authority and could have cut off funds for the American role in the
conflict. Again there was an effort to do so but it failed;
appropriations were authorized. And there always remains the
possibility of impeachment should a President act in disregard of
Congress' authority on these matters.
* * * *
Appellants' constitutional claim stands on no firmer footing.
Appellants argue that the War Powers Clause of the Constitution
proscribes a President from using military force except as is
necessary to repel a sudden attack. But they also argue that the WPR
"implements" or channels congressional authority under the
Constitution. It may well be then that since we have determined that
appellants lack standing to enforce the [**14] WPR there is
nothing left of their constitutional claim. Assuming, however, that
appellants' constitutional claim should be considered separately, the
same logic dictates they do not have standing to bring such a
challenge. That is to say Congress has a broad range of legislative
authority it can use to stop a President's war making, see
generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
167 (1996), and therefore under Raines congressmen may not
challenge the President's war-making powers in federal court.
Judge Randolph asserts that appellants lack standing because they do
not claim that the President violated various statutes that depend on
the existence of a war or the imminence of war. But that
position sidesteps appellants' basic claim that the President
unconstitutionally conducted a war without authority, and the logic of
Judge Randolph's reasoning ("There is no suggestion that despite
the vote, President Clinton invaded Yugoslavia by land or took
some other action authorized only during a declared war.") is
that if there had been a "war" appellants would have had
standing. [**15] See infra at 6 (Randolph, J.,
concurring). n5 He therefore presents as an alternate reason for
denying standing that the President did not "nullify" the
vote against the declaration of war because he did not take any
actions that constitute "war" in the constitutional sense. See
id. at 4-6. That analysis, however, conflates standing with the
merits. At the [*24] standing stage we must take as
correct appellants' claim that the President violated the Constitution
simply by ordering U.S. forces to attack Yugoslavia.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 It is certainly not logically necessary for appellants to assert a
violation of the statutes (three of which do not even depend on a
declaration of war) relied upon by the concurrence in order to make
their constitutional claim.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In our view Judge Randolph's criticism of our analysis does not give
sufficient attention to Raines' focus on the political
self-help available to congressmen. See infra at 8-9 (Randolph,
J., concurring). Even though the congressmen in Raines sought
review before [**16] the Court of what was soon after
determined in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 393, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), to be an unconstitutional statute,
the Court denied them standing as congressmen because they possessed
political tools with which to remedy their purported injury. Our
colleague notes a distinction drawn by Raines between "the
right to vote in the future [and] the nullification of a vote in the
past," see infra at 8 (Randolph, J., concurring), and
asserts that the former does not remedy the latter. But Raines
rejected this argument, which is why the congressmen in Raines
lacked standing whereas petitioners in New York were allowed to
contest the President's "nullification" of particular
appropriations line items. Indeed, Raines explicitly rejected
Judge Randolph's argument that legislators should not be required to
turn to politics instead of the courts for their remedy. Although the
plaintiff legislators in Raines had already failed to stop
passage of the Line Item Veto Act, the Court's response was the
equivalent of "if at first you don't succeed, try and try
again"--either work for repeal of the Act, [**17] or
seek to have individual spending bills made exempt. See Raines,
521 U.S. at 824-25, 825 n.9, 830. Judge Randolph overlooks this key
portion of Raines when he disagrees with our conclusion that
plaintiffs lack standing because they may "fight again
tomorrow." Infra at 8 (Randolph, J., concurring). n6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Judge Randolph also contends that our opinion is in conflict with Chenoweth
v. Clinton,
337 U.S. App.
D.C. 1, 181
F.3d 112, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But as we have already described
that opinion, see supra at 5, it too focused on the political
options available to congressmen when denying them standing. Chenoweth
did not hold, as Judge Randolph would have it, that Kennedy v.
Sampson, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
survived Raines. Instead, we stressed the increased emphasis
placed by such post-Kennedy cases as Raines on
separation of powers concerns. See Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at
113-15. Although appellants' injury in Chenoweth was
"precisely the harm we held in ... Kennedy to be
cognizable under Article III," it was also "identical to the
injury the Court in Raines deprecated as 'widely dispersed' and
'abstract,' " and therefore we affirmed the district court's
dismissal for lack of standing. Id. We only suggested
tentatively that "Kennedy may remain good law ... as a
peculiar application of the narrow rule announced in" Coleman.
See id. at 116 (emphasis added). Indeed, Judge Tatel
understandably read our opinion to "essentially overrule[] the
theory of legislative standing recognized in Kennedy...." See
id. at 117 (Tatel, J., concurring). In any event, Chenoweth's
discussion of Kennedy's fate after Raines was dicta, and
we need not decide for purposes of this case if Kennedy, which
involved the special question of a pocket veto, survived Raines.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**18]
* * * *
Accordingly, the district court is affirmed; appellants lack standing.
CONCURBY: SILBERMAN
CONCUR: SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: Appellants
argued that we should consider in our standing analysis that if
congressmen lack standing only military personnel might be able to
challenge a President's arguably unlawful use of force, and it would
be undesirable to put the armed forces in such a position. Although
that is not a consideration that bears on standing, see Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227, 41 L. Ed.
2d 706, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974), that argument leads me to observe that,
in my view, no one is able to bring this challenge because the two
claims are not justiciable. We lack "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for addressing them, and the War Powers
Clause p[WPC] claim implicates the [*25] political
question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962).
Prior litigation under the WPR has turned on the threshold test
whether U.S. forces are engaged in hostilities or are in imminent
danger of hostilities. But the question posed by appellants -- whether
the [**19] President's refusal to discontinue American
activities in Yugoslavia violates the WPR -- necessarily depends on
the statute having been triggered in the first place. It has been held
that the statutory threshold standard is not precise enough and too
obviously calls for a political judgment to be one suitable for
judicial determinations. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
248 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (aid to
Contras); Crockett v. Reagan, 232 U.S. App. D.C. 128, 720 F.2d
1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (U.S. advisors in El Salvador); see
also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (pre-Gulf
War buildup); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 n.53 (D.D.C.
1987) (reflagging operations in the Persian Gulf). I think that is
correct. Appellants point to a House Report suggesting that
hostilities for purposes of the WPR include all situations "where
there is a reasonable expectation that American military personnel
will be subject to hostile fire." See H.R. REP. NO. 287,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). That elaboration hardly helps. It
could reasonably be thought that anytime [**20] American
soldiers are confronted by armed or potentially armed forces of a
non-ally there is a reasonable expectation that they will be subject
to hostile fire. Certainly any competent military leader will assume
that to be so.
Appellants argue that here there is no real problem of definition
because this air war was so overwhelming and indisputable. It is
asserted that the President implicitly conceded the applicability of
the WPR by sending the report to Congress. In truth, the President
only said the report was "consistent" with the WPR. In any
event, I do not think it matters how clear it is in any particular
case that "hostilities" were initiated if the statutory
standard is one generally unsuited to judicial resolution.
Nor is the constitutional claim justiciable. Appellants contend this
case is governed by Mitchell v. Laird, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 344,
488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where we said that "there
would be no insuperable difficulty in a court determining
whether" the Vietnam conflict constituted a war in the
Constitutional sense. See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990) ( "The Court has no hesitation in
concluding [**21] that an offensive entry into Iraq by
several hundred thousand United States servicemen ... could be
described as a 'war' within the meaning ... of the
Constitution."). But a careful reading of both cases reveals that
the language upon which appellants rely is only dicta. (In Laird
the Court ultimately held that the resolution of the issues was a
political question. See 488 F.2d at 616.) n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 The additional cases upon which Judge Tatel relies with respect to
this point were also held to present political questions. See
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971) ("All
we hold here is that in a situation of prolonged but undeclared
hostilities, where the executive continues to act not only in the
absence of any conflicting congressional claim of authority but with
steady congressional support, the Constitution has not been
breached."); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d
Cir. 1971) (whether Vietnam conflict required a declaration of war was
a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1970) (denying a preliminary injunction against dispatch of soldier to
Vietnam because whether Congress had authorized conflict was a
political question).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**22]
Appellants cannot point to any constitutional test for what is war. See,
e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 38 L. Ed. 2d 28, 94
S. Ct. 8 (1973) (Justice Douglas, in chambers, vacating order of Court
of Appeals granting stay of district court's injunction against
bombing of Cambodia), 414 U.S. 1321, 94 S. Ct. 11, 38 L. Ed. 2d 33
(1973) (Justice Marshall, in chambers, granting stay the same day with
the concurrence of the other Justices); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding [*26] legality of
Cambodia bombing nonjusticiable because courts lack expertise to
determine import of various military actions). Instead, appellants
offer a rough definition of war provided in 1994 by an Assistant
Attorney General to four Senators with respect to a planned
intervention in Haiti, as well as a number of law review articles each
containing its own definition of war. I do not think any of these
sources, however, offers a coherent test for judges to apply to the
question what constitutes war, a point only accentuated by the
variances, for instance, between the numerous law review articles. For
that reason, I disagree with Judge Tatel's assertion that we can
decide appellants' [**23] constitutional claim because it
is somehow obvious in this case that our country fought a war. See
infra at 6 (Tatel, J., concurring). Baker v. Carr speaks of
a case involving "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" the issue presented, see
369 U.S. at 217, not just a case the facts of which are obscure; the
focus is on the standards. Even if this court knows all there is to
know about the Kosovo conflict, we still do not know what standards to
apply to those facts.
Judge Tatel points to numerous cases in which a court has determined
that our nation was at war, but none of these cases involved the
question whether the President had "declared war" in
violation of the Constitution. For instance, in Bas v. Tingy, 4
U.S. 37, 1 L. Ed. 731 (1800), the question whether there was a
"war" was only relevant to determining whether France was an
"enemy" within the meaning of a prize statute. See id.
at 37 ("The argument turned, principally, upon two inquiries:
1st. Whether the Act of March 1799, applied only to the event of a
future general war? 2d. Whether France was an enemy of the
United States, [**24] within the meaning of the
law?"). Indeed, Justice Washington's opinion in that case, upon
which Judge Tatel principally relies, suggests that whether there was
a war in the constitutional sense was irrelevant. See id. at 42
("Besides, it may be asked, why should the rate of salvage be
different in such a war as the present, from the salvage in a war more
solemn [i.e. a declared war] or general?"). It is
similarly irrelevant that courts have determined the existence of a
war in cases involving insurance policies and other contracts, the
Federal Tort Claims Act, and provisions of the military criminal code
applicable in "time of war." See infra at 4-5 (Tatel,
J., concurring). None of these cases asked whether there was a war as
the Constitution uses that word, but only whether a particular
statutory or contractual provision was triggered by some instance of
fighting. Comparing Bas v. Tingy's lengthy discussion whether
our quarrel with France constituted a solemn or imperfect, general or
limited war, see 4 U.S. at 40-41, with today's propensity to
label any widespread conflict an undifferentiated war, it would not be
surprising if an insurance [**25] contract's
"war" provisions, or even a statute's for that matter, were
triggered before the Constitution's.
Even assuming a court could determine what "war" is, it is
important to remember that the Constitution grants Congress the power
to declare war, which is not necessarily the same as the power to
determine whether U.S. forces will fight in a war. This distinction
was drawn in the THE BRIG AMY WARWICK., THE SCHOONER CRENSHAW., THE
BARQUE, HIAWATHA., THE SCHOONER BRILLIANTE, Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
635, 17 L. Ed. 459, 2 Black 635 (1862). There, petitioners challenged
the authority of the President to impose a blockade on the
secessionist States, an act of war, where Congress had not declared
war against the Confederacy. The Court, while recognizing that the
President "has no power to initiate or declare a war,"
observed that "war may exist without a declaration on either
side." Id. at 668. In instances where war is declared
against the United States by the actions of another country, the
President "does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the
challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."
Id. Importantly, the Court made clear that it would not dispute
the President on measures necessary to [*27] repel foreign
aggression. The President alone [**26]
must determine what degree of force the
crisis demands. The proclamation of blockade is itself official and
conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which
demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the
circumstances peculiar to the case.
Id. at 670. n2 And, to confirm the
independent authority of the President to meet foreign aggression, the
Court noted that while Congress had authorized the war, it may not
have been required to: "If it were necessary to the
technical existence of a war, that it should have a legislative
sanction, we find it...." Id. (emphasis added).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Judge Tatel's reliance on the Prize Cases as an example of
the Court concluding a war exists is misplaced because the Court
itself did not label the Civil War such, but instead deferred to the
President's determination that the country was at war. See 67
U.S. at 670 ("Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as
Commander-in-chief ... has met with such armed hostile resistance ...
as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is
a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be
governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted") (emphasis in
original). Therefore, the Court's assertion that "it is bound to
notice and to know" the war, see id. at 667, provides no
support for the proposition that a court itself may decide when in
fact there is one. The Prize Cases thus refute the suggestion
in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28, 2 L. Ed. 15 (1801), that
only acts of Congress are evidence of the existence of a war. See
infra at 2 (Tatel, J., concurring).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**27]
I read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the
President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third
parties even without specific congressional authorization, and courts
may not review the level of force selected. See Geoffrey Corn, Presidential
War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 180,
214 (1998); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27,
54 (1991); Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the
President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79,
85 (1984). Therefore, I assume, arguendo, that appellants are
correct and only Congress has authority to initiate
"war." If the President may direct U.S. forces in response
to third-party initiated war, then the question any plaintiff who
challenges the constitutionality of a war must answer is, who started
it? The question of who is responsible for a conflict is, as history
reveals, rather difficult to answer, and we lack judicial standards
for resolving it. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles
v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court [**28]
lacked judicially manageable standards to decide if placement of U.S.
cruise missiles in England was a war-like, "aggressive"
act). Then there is the problem of actually discovering the necessary
information to answer the question, when such information may be
unavailable to the U.S. or its allies, or unavailable to courts due to
its sensitivity. See id. at 1338. Perhaps Yugoslavia did pose a
threat to a much wider region of Europe and to U.S. civilian and
military interests and personnel there.
Judge Tatel does not take into account the Prize Cases when he
concludes that the President was not exercising his independent
authority to respond to foreign aggression because "in fact, the
Kosovo issue had been festering for years." See infra at 6
(Tatel, J., concurring). As quoted above the President alone
"must determine what degree of force the crisis demands." See
67 U.S. at 670. Judge Tatel would substitute our judgment for the
President's as to the point at which an intervention for reasons of
national security is justified, after which point--when the crisis is
no longer acute--the President must obtain a declaration of war. One
should bear [**29] in mind that Kosovo's tensions antedate
the creation of this republic.
In most cases this will also be an issue of the greatest sensitivity
for our foreign relations. Here, the President claimed on [*28]
national television that our country needed to respond to Yugoslav
aggression to protect our trading interests in Europe, and to prevent
a replay of World War I. A pronouncement by another branch of the U.S.
government that U.S. participation in Kosovo was
"unjustified" would no doubt cause strains within NATO. Cf.
United States v. New, 50 M.J. 729, 739-40 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
1999) (lawfulness of U.N. peacekeeping operation in Macedonia was a
political question).
In sum, there are no standards to determine either the statutory or
constitutional questions raised in this case, and the question of
whether the President has intruded on the war-declaring authority of
Congress fits squarely within the political question doctrine. We
therefore have another basis for our affirming the district court's
dismissal of appellants' case.
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: The
majority opinion does not, I believe, correctly analyze plaintiffs'
standing to sue. [**30] It misconceives the holding of Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997),
and conflicts with the law of this circuit. I believe plaintiffs lack
standing, at least to litigate their constitutional claim, but for
reasons the majority opinion neglects. I also believe that the case is
moot, an optional disposition of the appeal. n1 The serious questions
about the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution n2 must
therefore be put off for still another day.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 While we may be required to decide jurisdictional issues before
disposing of a case on the merits, we are not required to decide
jurisdictional questions in any particular order. See Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67, 137 L. Ed. 2d
170, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Galvan v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc.,
339 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 199 F.3d 461, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33135, *4
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d
210 (1998); Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 119
S. Ct. 1563, 143 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1999)). Specifically, we may assume
standing when dismissing a case as moot. See Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 145 L. Ed. 2d 610, 120 S. Ct. 693,
2000 WL 16307, at *9 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2000) (citing Arizonans,
520 U.S. at 66-67). [**31]
n2 I include as an Addendum to this opinion President Nixon's 1973
message to the House of Representatives explaining why he vetoed the
War Powers Resolution on the grounds of its unconstitutionality.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I. Standing
The Constitution reserves the power to declare "war" n3 to
Congress and delegates the power to conduct war to the President. Compare
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, with id. art. II, § 2. When
President Clinton committed armed forces to the attack on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, he did so without a declaration of war from
Congress. On April 28, 1999, after air operations and missile strikes
were underway, the House of Representatives voted 427 to 2 against a
declaration of war. See H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999); 126
CONG. REC. H2440-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3
War may be defined [as] the exercise
of violence under sovereign command against withstanders; force,
authority and resistance being the essential parts thereof.
Violence, limited by authority, is sufficiently distinguished from
robbery, and like outrages; yet consisting in relation towards
others, it necessarily requires a supposition of resistance, whereby
the force of war becomes different from the violence
inflicted upon slaves or yielding malefactors.
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (facsimile ed.,
Times Books, Ltd., London 1978) (1755). See United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335, 141 L. Ed. 2d 314, 118 S. Ct. 2028
(1998) (citing Johnson); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
229-30, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (same); see also Bas
v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 1 L. Ed. 731 (1800) (relying on
Blackstone and other commentators to distinguish between perfect and
imperfect wars).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**32]
The War Powers Resolution, passed over President Nixon's veto in 1973,
implements Congress's power to declare war under the Constitution. See
50 U.S.C. § 1541(a)-(b). It commands the President [*29]
to "terminate any use of United States Armed Forces" within
sixty days "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The Senate, on March 23,
1999, passed a concurrent resolution providing that "the
President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air
operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." S. Con. Res. 21,
106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REC. S3118 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1999).
The House rejected that measure by a tie vote on April 28, 1999. See
126 CONG. REC. H2451-52 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
The Members of Congress appearing as plaintiffs contend that President
Clinton violated the Constitution and the War Powers [**33]
Resolution and that they are entitled to a judicial declaration so
stating. They have standing, they say, because President Clinton's
prosecution of the war "completely nullified" their votes
against declaring war and against authorizing a continuation of the
hostilities. See Amended Complaint P 18; Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, 16.
A.
The quoted phrase--"completely nullified"--is from Raines
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849, 117 S. Ct. 2312
(1997), giving the Court's appraisal of the rule in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939). The
majority opinion in our case seems to assume that the only thing left
of legislative standing is whatever Raines preserves. I will
not quarrel with the assumption, at least for cases in which a
legislator is claiming that his vote has been illegally nullified. n4
The heart of the Raines decision is this: "legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific
legislative act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes
into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their
votes have been completely nullified. [**34] " 521
U.S. at 823. n5
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 The Court has "recognized that state legislators have standing
to contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State's
interests," Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (citing Karcher
v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82, 98 L. Ed. 2d 327, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987)).
Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5, 939-40, 77 L. Ed.
2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), in which the "Court held Congress
to be a proper party to defend [a] measure's validity where both
Houses, by resolution, had authorized intervention in the
lawsuit," and the executive branch refused to defend the
one-House veto provision. 520 U.S. at 65 n.20.
n5 A vote is "completely nullified" when it is
"deprived of all validity," Raines, 521 U.S. at 822,
"overridden and virtually held for naught," id. at
822-23, or "stripped of its validity," id. at 824
n.7.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**35]
Here, plaintiffs had the votes "sufficient to defeat"
"a specific legislative action"--they defeated a declaration
of war (their constitutional claim) and they blocked a resolution
approving the President's continuation of the war (their statutory
claim). To follow precisely the formulation in Raines, they
would have standing only if the legislative actions they defeated went
"into effect." Obviously, this did not happen: war was not
declared, and the President never maintained that he was prosecuting
the war with the House's approval.
Plaintiffs' reply is that the President's military action against
Yugoslavia without congressional authorization had the effect of
completely nullifying their votes, of making their votes worthless.
With respect to their vote against declaring war, that clearly is not
true. A congressional declaration of war carries with it profound
consequences. n6 The United States Code [*30] is thick
with laws expanding executive power "in time of war." See
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, DIGEST
OF WAR AND EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
171-84 (1996) (listing statutes "effective in time of war");
cf. [**36] id. at 185-91 (listing statutes
"effective in time of national emergency declared by the
President"); id. at 192-98 (listing statutes
"effective in time of national emergency declared by
Congress"). n7 Under these laws, the President's authority over
industries, the use of land, and the terms and conditions of military
employment is greatly enhanced. n8 A declaration of war may also have
the effect of decreasing commercial choices and curtailing civil
liberties. n9 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218-19 (1998) ("Without question the
government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil
liberty is greatest in time of declared war--the Schenck and Hirabayashi
opinions make this clear... But from the point of view of governmental
authority under the Constitution, it is clear that the President may
do many things in carrying out a congressional directive that he may
not be able to do on his own.").
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Although the United States has committed its armed forces into
combat more than a hundred times, Congress has declared war only five
times: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War of 1848, the
Spanish-American War of 1898, World War I, and World War II. See
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1789-1989 (Ellen C. Collier ed., 1989), reprinted
in THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 650 (2d ed. 1993); OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE LEGALITY OF UNITED STATES
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM (1966), reprinted in 1
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk ed.,
1968) (listing 125 incidents prior to the Vietnam Conflict). [**37]
n7 In the early days of the Republic, the
power of the executive in time of war was constrained by an absence of
legislation. For example, in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110, 3 L. Ed. 504 (1814), the Court rejected the argument that
the President had the authority to confiscate enemy property found
within the United States without explicit statutory authority even
during a declared war. See id. at 129. The same reasoning was
applied to the taking of ships on the high seas in Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 2 L. Ed. 243 (1804). Even in the
wake of World War II, after Congress passed a large number of
war-related measures, the Court strictly construed the President's
authority. The most notable example, of course, is Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S.
Ct. 863 (1952) ("The President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."); cf. also Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
n8 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2538 (authorizing the President to
"take immediate possession of any plant that is equipped to
manufacture, or that ... is capable of manufacturing" war
material "in time of war or when war is imminent"); 10 U.S.C.
§ 2644 ("In time of war, the President, through the Secretary of
Defense, may take possession and assume control of all or part of any
system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and
equipment, or for other purposes related to the emergency."); 10
U.S.C. § 2663(b) ("In time of war or when war is imminent, the
United States may, immediately upon the filing of a petition for
condemnation under subsection (a), take and use the land to the extent
of the interest sought to be acquired."); 50 U.S.C. § 1829
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President,
through the Attorney General, may authorize physical searches without
a court order ... to acquire foreign intelligence information for a
period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration of war
by the Congress."). [**38]
n9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) ("Whoever, when the
United States is at war, willfully causes or attempts to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
military or naval forces of the United States, or willfully obstructs
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the
injury of the service or the United States, or attempts to do
so--Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both."); 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (tolling statute of
limitations for any offense involving fraud against the property of
the United States until three years after the termination of
hostilities).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The vote of the House on April 28, 1999,
deprived President Clinton of these powers. The vote against declaring
war followed [*31] immediately upon the vote not to require
immediate withdrawal. Those who voted against a declaration of war did
so to deprive the President of the authority to expand hostilities
beyond the bombing campaign and, specifically, to deprive him of the
authority to introduce ground troops [**39] into the
conflict. See 145 CONG. REC. H2427-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
There is no suggestion that despite the vote, President Clinton invaded
Yugoslavia by land or took some other action authorized only during a
declared war. It follows that plaintiffs' votes against declaring war
were not for naught. For that reason, plaintiffs do not have standing to
sue on their constitutional claim.
As to their claim under the War Powers Resolution, the beauty of this
measure, or one of its defects (see the Addendum to this opinion), is in
its automatic operation: unless a majority of both Houses declares war,
or approves continuation of hostilities beyond 60 days, or Congress is
"physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States," the Resolution requires the President to withdraw
the troops. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). The President has nothing to veto.
Congress may allow the time to run without taking any vote, or it
may--as the House did here-take a vote and fail to muster a majority in
favor of continuing the hostilities.
To put the matter in terms of Raines once again, plaintiffs had
the votes "sufficient to defeat" "a specific legislative [**40]
action"--they blocked a resolution authorizing the President's
continuation of the war with Yugoslavia--but it is not true, in the
language of Raines, that this "legislative action"
nevertheless went "into effect." Congressional authorization
simply did not occur. The President may have acted as if he had
Congress's approval, or he may have acted as if he did not need it.
Either way, plaintiffs' real complaint is not that the President ignored
their votes; it is that he ignored the War Powers Resolution, and hence
the votes of an earlier Congress, which enacted the law over President
Nixon's veto. It is hard for me to see that this amounts to anything
more than saying: "We, the members of Congress, have standing
because the President violated one of our laws." To hold that
Members of Congress may litigate on such a basis strikes me as highly
problematic, not only because the principle is unconfined but also
because it raises very serious separation-of-powers concerns. See
Raines, 521 U.S. at 825 n.8; Barnes v. Kline, 245 U.S. App.
D.C. 1, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated
as moot, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). [**41] But because the case
is moot, I need say no more.
B.
The majority opinion analyzes standing rather differently than I do. It
says plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their statutory claim because
"they continued, after the votes, to enjoy ample legislative power
to have stopped prosecution of the 'war.' " Maj. op. at 8. For
specifics, the opinion points out that Congress defeated House
Concurrent Resolution 82, a resolution requiring immediate disengagement
from the conflict in Yugoslavia; that "Congress always retains
appropriations authority and could have cut off funds for the American
role in the conflict"; n10 and that "there [*32]
always remains the possibility of impeachment." Id. n11 The
same reason--the possibility of future legislative action--is used to
defeat plaintiffs' standing with respect to their constitutional claim. Id.
at 9.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n10 The majority attaches some importance to Congress's decision to
authorize funding for Operation Allied Force and argues that Congress
could have denied funding if it wished to end the war. However, in Mitchell
v. Laird, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir.
1973), we held that, as "every schoolboy knows," Congress may
pass such legislation, not because it is in favor of continuing the
hostilities, but because it does not want to endanger soldiers in the
field. The War Powers Resolution itself makes the same point:
"Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred ... from any
provision of law (whether or not in effect before November 7, 1973), including
any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such
provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of this chapter." 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Those portions of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57, relating to the attacks on Yugoslavia
specified the limited purpose for the emergency appropriations, but
contained no language even roughly approximating that required by the
War Powers Resolution. See id., ch. 3, 113 Stat. 76-83. [**42]
n11 These are not the only possibilities. "It has been thought that
Congress could constitutionally cut the President's salary in half and
auction off the White House, reduce the President's staff to one
secretary, and limit her or him to answering personal
correspondence." A. Raymond Randolph, Introduction--Disciplining
Congress: The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & POL.
585, 586 (1997).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The majority has, I believe, confused the right to vote in the future
with the nullification of a vote in the past, a distinction Raines
clearly made. See 521 U.S. at 824. To say that your vote was not
nullified because you can vote for other legislation in the future is
like saying you did not lose yesterday's battle because you can fight
again tomorrow. The Supreme Court did not engage in such illogic. When
the Court in Raines mentioned the possibility of future
legislation, it was addressing the argument that "the [Line Item
Veto] Act will nullify the [Congressmen's] votes in the future...."
Id. This part of the Court's opinion, which the majority adopts
here, [**43] is quite beside the point to our case. No one
is claiming that their votes on future legislation will be impaired or
nullified or rendered ineffective.
Besides, as long as Congress and the Constitution exist, Members will
always be able to vote for legislation. And so the majority's decision
is tantamount to a decision abolishing legislative standing. I have two
problems with this. First, if we are going to get rid of legislative
standing altogether, we ought to do so openly and not under the cover of
an interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of a phrase in Raines.
If the Supreme Court had meant to do away with legislative standing, it
would have said so and it would have given reasons for taking that step.
My second problem is just as serious, perhaps more so: the majority's
decision conflicts with this court's latest legislative standing
decision. In Chenoweth
v. Clinton,
337 U.S. App. D.C.
1, 181 F.3d 112,
116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), we interpreted Raines consistently with
my analysis in this case and concluded that a previous legislative
standing decision of this court-- Kennedy v. Sampson, 167 U.S.
App. D.C. 192, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974)--upholding [**44]
legislative standing to challenge the legality of a pocket veto was
still good law. The plaintiff in Kennedy had standing under the
proper interpretation of Raines, we held, because the
"pocket veto challenged in that case had made ineffective a bill
that both houses of the Congress had approved. Because it was the
President's veto--not a lack of legislative support--that prevented the
bill from becoming law (either directly or by the Congress voting to
override the President's veto), those in the majority could plausibly
describe the President's action as a complete nullification of their
votes." 181 F.3d at 116-17. If Chenoweth is correct, the
majority opinion in this case must be wrong. If Chenoweth is
correct, it is no answer to say--as the majority says in this case--that
standing is lacking because, despite the pocket veto, Congress could
pass the same law again, or it could retaliate by cutting off
appropriations for the White House or it could impeach the President.
C.
My position, the majority complains, "sidesteps" plaintiffs'
merits "claim that [*33] the President
unconstitutionally conducted a war without authority," Maj. op. at
9. This is meant [**45] to be criticism? A properly-conducted
standing analysis almost always avoids--sidesteps--a decision on the
merits. n12 In the next breath, the majority turns around and
contradicts itself, proclaiming that my analysis "conflates
standing with the merits." Id. I am familiar with what I
have written. I do not recall having rendered a judgment about whether
the President violated the Constitution. The careful reader will, I
think, agree with me. Nor do I present "as an alternative reason
for denying standing that the President did not ... take any actions
constituting war in the constitutional sense." Id. The
majority's sentence is doubly misleading. Here is my alternative reason
for denying standing, pure and simple: regardless whether President
Clinton waged a "war," plaintiffs never claimed that he
exercised statutory authority reserved to him only when Congress has
declared a war; and so their votes against declaring war cannot be
considered a nullity. Thus, one, I have taken no position on whether the
President engaged in a "war," and two, I say only that
plaintiffs never alleged that the President utilized these
statutory powers. Too often a strategy in legal argumentation [**46]
is to pretend to answer an argument by misstating it. n13 My argument
remains unanswered. All the majority has done is to misstate it almost
as badly as it has misread Raines.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 The majority drops this footnote: "It is certainly not
logically necessary for appellants to assert a violation of the statutes
... relied upon by the concurrence in order to make their constitutional
claim." Maj. op. at 9 n.5. How strange a statement. I refer to the
statutes not in the context of plaintiffs' making their constitutional
claim, but in regard to their standing to litigate that claim. It is as
if the majority had made this brow-furrowing statement: "in order
to make out their constitutional claim, it is not logically necessary
for plaintiffs to assert that their votes were nullified within the
meaning of Raines."
n13 See also the sentence attributing to me the "argument that
legislators should not be required to turn to politics instead of the
courts for their remedy." Maj. op. at 10. There are other examples
not worth mentioning.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**47]
II. Mootness The amended complaint, filed on May 19, 1999, sought a
declaratory judgment "that no later than May 25, 1999, the
President must terminate the involvement of the United States Armed
Forces in such hostilities unless Congress declares war, or enacts other
explicit authorization, or has extended the sixty day period."
Amended Complaint at 12; see 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)(1)-(2). All
agree that the "hostilities" ended by June 21, 1999, after
NATO's Secretary General announced the official termination of the air
campaign and Secretary of Defense Cohen announced the redeployment of
more than 300 U.S. aircraft back to their home bases.
To save their case from mootness, plaintiffs therefore invoke the rule
regarding issues "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 S.
Ct. 279 (1911); Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. District of
Columbia, 297 U.S. App. D.C. 312, 972 F.2d 365, 369-71 (D.C. Cir.
1992). Plaintiffs must, but cannot, satisfy both elements to prevail.
Their constitutional and statutory claims are at cross purposes.
The "evading [**48] review" part of the formulation
is temporal. How quickly must an activity begin and end to evade
judicial review? This depends on which court does the reviewing. The
Supreme Court has treated the matter in terms of itself. Hence evading
review means evading Supreme Court review, see Christian Knights,
972 F.2d at 369, which can be (though usually is not) swift review. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 29 L. Ed.
2d 822, 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46
L. Ed. 2d 659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). Some undeclared wars, or in the
euphemism of the day, "hostilities," are over quickly; others,
like the Korean War and the war in [*34] Vietnam, last for
years. Circuit precedent requires us to determine whether the activity
challenged is "inherently" of a sort that evades review;
circuit precedent also holds that "offensive wars initiated without
congressional approval" are not in that category. Conyers v.
Reagan, 246 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 765 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1985). That holding, which remains the law of the circuit, means that we
must treat plaintiffs' claims as moot.
Plaintiffs' [**49] statutory claim--that President Clinton
continued the war for more than 60 days without congressional
authorization, in violation of the War Powers Resolution--also may not
satisfy the "capable of repetition" element. There is an
aspect of probability involved here. "By 'capable of repetition'
the Supreme Court means 'a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subject to the same action again.' " Christian
Knights, 972 F.2d at 370 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147, 149, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975) (per curiam)). n14
This introduces some complications. Who should be considered the
"same complaining parties"? And what is the "same action
again"?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 The Supreme Court recently stated that "a defendant claiming
that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden
of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur." Friends of the Earth,
2000 WL 16307, at *14 (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 21 L. Ed. 2d 344, 89 S. Ct. 361
(1968)). The President's cessation of the attack on Yugoslavia was not
"voluntary" within the Court's meaning; the war ended because
the United States won, not because the President sought to avoid
litigation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [**50]
The same "complaining parties" must refer to the individual
Members of Congress who brought this suit. They have sued in their
official capacity and, as in Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 79-81,
98 L. Ed. 2d 327, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987), the injury they allege relates
to their conduct as legislators. Thus, in assessing the likelihood of a
recurrence of "the same action," the inquiry must be
restricted only to the period in which these Congressmen would likely
remain in office. As to the "same action," this refers to
President Clinton's alleged violation of the War Powers Resolution by
continuing hostilities for more than 60 days without Congress's
affirmative approval. How likely is that to recur? Not very, if history
is any guide. The War Powers Resolution has been in effect for a quarter
of a century. Yet President Clinton is the first President who arguably
violated the 60-day provision. In order to show why their claims will
"evade review," plaintiffs tell us that, in modern times,
United States attacks on foreign nations will be over quickly, by which
they mean less than 60 days. n15 Accepting that prediction as accurate
dooms their case. It means that the likelihood [**51] of this
President, or some other, violating the 60-day provision of the War
Powers Resolution is remote, not only because we can expect other
Presidents to obtain congressional approval for wars lasting more than
60 days, but also because most military actions in the future (as
plaintiffs agree) will be over before the 60-day limit for undeclared or
unauthorized wars has been exceeded.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15 "The 1998 air attack against Afghanistan and Sudan, the
December 1998 air attacks against Iraq, the 1995 air assault against the
Bosnian Serbs, the 1994 Haitian invasion, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the
1989 Panama invasion, the 1986 air attack against Lybia, the 1983
Grenada attack were all completed in less than 60 days." Reply
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5-6.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ADDENDUM
Veto of War Powers Resolution
The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning
H.J. Res. 542 Without His Approval. October 24, 1973
To the House of Representatives:
I hereby return without my approval [**52] House Joint
Resolution 542--the War [*35] Powers Resolution. While I am
in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in
the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this
resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are both
unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.
The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the conduct of
foreign affairs have been debated since the founding of our country.
Only recently, however, has there been a serious challenge to the wisdom
of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and detailed
line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two
branches.
The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing every
contingency that might arise in this complex area. They acknowledged the
need for flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. They
recognized that foreign policy decisions must be made through close
cooperation between the two branches and not through rigidly codified
procedures.
These principles remain as valid today as they were when our
Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would violate
those principles [**53] by defining the President's powers in
ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority.
Clearly Unconstitutional
House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere
legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised
under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would
automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the
Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate
certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution--an
action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies
the President his constitutional role in approving legislation.
I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The only way
in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be
altered is by amending the Constitution-and any attempt to make such
alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force.
Undermining Our Foreign Policy
While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution 542 is
warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I am also deeply disturbed
by the practical consequences of this resolution. [**54] For
it would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and
convincingly in times of international crisis. As a result, the
confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be
diminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture
could decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability
would be injected into the world's assessment of American behavior,
further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.
If this resolution had been in operation, America's effective response
to a variety of challenges in recent years would have been vastly
complicated or even made impossible. We may well have been unable to
respond in the way we did during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the
Jordanian crisis of 1970--to mention just a few examples. In addition,
our recent actions to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
hostilities in the Middle East would have been seriously impaired if
this resolution had been in force.
While all the specific consequences of House Joint Resolution 542 cannot
yet be predicted, it is clear that it would undercut the ability of [**55]
the United States to act as an effective influence for peace. For
example, the provision automatically cutting off certain authorities
after 60 days unless they are extended by the Congress could work to
prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress suspended the
deadline, [*36] there would be at least a chance of |